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Abstract
After  careful  reading of  Kavulya  [2013],  [2] it  was  the informed view of this  researcher,  that  the 
methods  described  in  the  Doctoral  Dissertation  could  very  easily  resolve  Chronic  Performance 
Problems(CPPs) at Command Centers related to Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems.  It is however 
not possible to use the same methods to resolve Chronic Performance Problems occurring in On-board 
Mission Critical Systems on Lethal Autonomous Weapons, that are unmanned and deployed/fielded on 
a non-interactive basis. Nyagudi [2014], [1] attempts to offer some insights, concepts, methods and 
approaches, that would facilitate the robust performance of lethal autonomous weapon systems.  With 
the  benefit  of  insights  from  Kavulya [2014],  [2]  and  a  background  in  the  physical  sciences  and 
knowledge in tactical operations realities, the researcher of this paper proposes an upgraded approach 
to Nyagudi [2014], [1] for delivering robust performance by way of a Autonomous Hot Swap Healing 
Protocol for Chronic Performance Problem Aversion in On-board Mission Critical Systems on Lethal 
Autonomous  Weapons.  A major assumption for the actualization of this concept would be that micro-
circuitry  and  nano-circuitry  offer  almost  unlimited  scope  for  hosting  back-up  systems  to  mission 
critical systems – without substantial increase of physical load that would generate resource challenges. 
But in the realm of physical sciences a paradox arises – the more miniaturization is  achieved, the 
greater the likelihood for chronic performance problems in micro-circuitry and nano-circuitry due to 
externally  induced  and/or  intrinsic  parasitic  phenomena  both  at  quantum  and  electronic  levels. 
Parasitic quantum phenomena and electromagnetic interference could be encountered in purportedly 
electronic  circuits,  due  to  miniaturization.  A balance  must  be  found  that  renders  this  “Gremlins 
Paradox” negligible. 
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0 Introduction
Article  36  of  Additional  Protocol  I  of  the  Geneva  Convention  [3]  states  that,  “In  the  study, 
development,  acquisition  or  adoption  of  a  new  weapon,  means  or  method  of  warfare,  a  High 
Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all  
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the 
High Contracting Party.” 
This article of international law obliges High Contracting parties to take all reasonable precaution in 
ensuring safety and compliance with international humanitarian law when deploying robot type lethal 
autonomous  weapons,  that  can  for  all  intents  and  purposes  be  classified  as  new and/or  emerging 
weapons – the 1987 commentary [4] to Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention 
envisages  High  Contracting  parties  undertaking  legal  reviews  pertaining  to  the  development  and 
deployment of new and emerging weapons.  Other norms of war such as reasonable precaution also 
necessitate legal reviews of new and/or emerging weapon system technologies.
If [1] is considered as an emerging technology/study, and some information has come to light via [2] 
that can improve its legality and performance – i.e. the researcher who drew up [1] has acquired more 
relevant knowledge by way of studying the concepts in [2] and other sources, he is therefore obliged by 
legal statute laid out in [3] and explained in [4] to upgrade the concept into legal compliance or to 
retract it all together, if he is unable to upgrade it.  In this case the researcher has determined that an 
upgrade is feasible for purposes of continuity and compliance, such that [1] is enabled to tackle CPPs.
Nyagudi Musandu Nyagudi                                                                                             Page  2  of  14 
1 Rationale
Miniaturization has enabled man to progress from low processing power multi-room size computers to 
high processing power hand held smart phones.  The transistor has declined in size from vase sized 
tubes to micro-circuitry.  With ever smaller transistor sizes, man has added computational power while 
reducing the sizes of the hosting systems.  There is a limit to this phenomenon, a transistor is made up 
of thousands if not hundreds of atoms – it is therefore impossible to obtain a transistor that is smaller 
than an atom.  
When circuits are reduced to molecular level, there is notable quantum interference, which makes it  
impossible  to  produce  electronic  circuitry  using  classical  techniques.   In  the  quest  for  the 
infinitesimally small electronic component to pack ever more computational capability into devices, 
man is faced with the challenges of parasitic electromagnetic, electrical and quantum interference, ie. 
The  “Gremlins  Paradox”,  due  to  the  unintentional,  counter-intuitive,  counter-productive  and 
problematic effects of the same, if classic electronic techniques alone are deployed. 
Quantum interference[5] can be harnessed to create a new generation of electronic devices, but this is 
still  just  a  theoretical  possibility  due  to  the  fact  that  the  molecules  used  are  organic  and  the 
experimental  set-ups  are  too  delicate  for  real  world  usage  in  most  instances.   The  occurrence  of 
quantum interference in standard micro-circuitry would be parasitic in most instances and result in 
chronic performance problems, if the circuit in question is part of a computing device or facility.  There 
are many other papers with similar content to those of [5].  It is very clear that quantum interference 
can cause unintended alteration to electronic bit strings.  
Quantum level circuits would also be more sensitive to external electromagnetic and magnetic forces. 
Simply stated : Miniaturization allows for devices that increase the computational capacity of a system 
in ever more limited space, however it also causes intrinsic and deep rooted interference problems 
within the same circuits, that are likely to cause CPPs in a computing environment.
Since it is not possible to do away with current and emerging hardware, there should be a way of  
resolving  the  wide  range  of  chronic  performance  problems.   These  may  arise  in  circuits  due  to 
interference of various kinds at low level resulting in malfunction or under-performance of a system.
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2 Reviews and Differentiation
Kopp [6] offers various photos and written explanations as to the mesh seen shrouding the Electro-
optical seeker windows of various image homing missiles.  It is explained that this Faraday cage type 
feature  shields  the  mission  critical  control  systems  therein  from  electromagnetic  radio  frequency 
induced interference [8].   The cumulative effect of exposure to the same may imply that  a image 
homing missile may have disruption in its guidance and strike outside its targeted area.  Given that 
embedded and other computing systems are housed in missile warheads, this is an extreme but relevant 
case of the destruction that can be brought about via chronic performance problems.
Day to day experience with chronic performance problems in the personal computing environment are 
not  strange,  but  may remain unclassified to  the non-expert  user.   At  first,  persons  log on to  their  
desktop, smart phone, tablet or laptop computers without much problem after booting up.  But after 
hours or days of usage, functions such as bluetooth become “stubborn” and multiple applications may 
not work as flawless as when the computer was first switched on – it is safe to assume then that this is  
the cumulative effect of chronic performance problems as detailed in [2].  This example puts into 
perspective the terminology of CPPs, for the most basic users of computing devices and systems.
When  dealing  with  unmanned  weapon  systems,  especially  those  that  remain  uncontrolled  and 
autonomous  for  substantial  periods  of  time,  upon  release  into  a  battle-space  chronic  performance 
problems would be a major concern.  The range of problems that may arise would be, eg.:
1. performance variation : wrong re-targeting or faulty target identification
2. terminal malfunctions : loss of weapon
3. crippling malfunctions : weapons perform but do so outside desired time parameters
Previous theories that may easily explain such occurrences would have been those of Computational 
Complexity and Mathematical  Chaos.   CPPs however  deal  with  those  and much more,  making it 
difficult  for a weapon systems engineer to properly estimate all  possible outcomes,  once a type of 
weapon  is  fielded.   These  could  be  caused  by  intra-circuit  heating,  quantum  interference, 
electromagnetic frequency interference, computational complexity, mathematical chaos, poor or faulty 
design, software bugs, etc.
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These  functional  anomalies  could  affect  navigation,  targeting  and economy of  resource  utilization 
within a lethal autonomous weapon system platform.  Unlike in the domain of commercial services, 
whose usage  of  production  systems is  all  about  profits  and losses,  in  the  realm of  warfare  lethal 
autonomous weapons and production systems based in command centers deal with matters of life and 
death, hence the importance of completely minimizing if not eradicating any possibility of CPPs.
Causes of CPPs could be:
1. Hardware design, damage or defect problems
2. Faulty configuration
3. Software design, damage or defect problems
4. etc.
Given the scope of these source of problems, there is no computer system running in the world today, 
without CPPs of one kind or another.  An extrapolation of this would be the fact that indeed all lethal 
autonomous weapon systems have some form of CPPs that have not been detected.  In the view of this 
researcher,  it  is  an  issue  that  has  not  been  raised  in  any of  the  past  research  papers  into  lethal 
autonomous weapons.  Failure to provide a convincing method for dealing with the problem would 
render it illegal to use any kind of lethal autonomous weapon, especially of the robotic kind, that is 
unleashed into a battle-space as an autonomous warfighter.
A generic method for dealing with CPPs on-board lethal autonomous weapon systems is  therefore 
proposed in this paper.  The methods proposed for use in Production Systems by [2] do not meet this  
requirement on an “as is” basis for the following reasons:
1. a human systems administrator is required
2. they are specific to particular hardware and software and are not general guidelines
3. for the systems in [2] their failure do not necessarily translate into life and death issues
4. many of the methods may discover but do not resolve the problems
5. CPPs  may  affect  the  tools  that  are  used  to  discover  them,  complicating  the  unresolved 
“Gremlins Paradox”
6. their implementation by remote control leads to the possibility of hacking into a weapon system
7. Electromagnetic spectrum emissions may betray weapon location and concealment
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But the methods in [2] for dealing with the problem of CPPs may work very well for highly complex 
military command centers, where data from many fielded weapon systems is converged and processed. 
The computational platforms therein are usually extensive and prone to faults and disruption of the 
kinds detailed in [2].  Lethal autonomous weapons in most cases are designed and fielded on a basis of 
necessity,  i.e.  communications  can  be  interfered  with  by  a  skilled  adversary,  time-lapse  between 
transmission and reception may be unacceptable in the specific domain of a mission critical system.  
To add on to this mix, would be the fact that if methods of [2] are deployed remotely on a lethal 
autonomous weapon system, they may add more overhead to the OODA(observe,  orient,  decision, 
action) loop, exposing the platform and its mission to potential failure via adversarial countermeasure.
In the military procurement and logistics chain,  issues pertaining to CPPs are not new, indeed the 
concept applies to all manner of components computers, electronics, mechanical, hydraulic, etc.  [7] 
describes them as “lemons”, when they are repeatedly “repaired” in a bid to make a fielded system to 
work as per expectation.  [7] also states that the more complex a weapon system is, the more reduced 
its availability and the greater its maintenance costs.  “Lemons” were viewed as troublesome in the 
military logistics chain and all efforts were made to identify them in the low production phase of a 
weapon system during field trials.  Field trials are used to collect as much data as possible and all 
components have serial numbers, thereby making it easy to pick out the “lemons”, by way of databases. 
Data analysis leads to weapon system re-design and maturity, as a lot of the information is discovered 
via databases during field trials.  It is not difficult to infer at this point that other causes of “lemons” 
may include the issue of low quality components due to counterfeits in the supply chain.  At the turn of 
the  century more  and more  computers  were  introduced into  weapon systems.   These  increasingly 
complex devices came with many CPPs that are unlikely to be identified by way of field trials.  
Presumably though field trials continue during the low production phases of weapon systems, but CPPs 
are not readily identified then and the “lemons” became more and more likely to show up in the naval,  
air  and  land  battle-space.   Since  some  weapon  systems  use  commercially  available  off-the-shelf 
computers such as laptops, some of the CPPs experienced day to day by personal computer users are 
also experienced in the domain of mission critical computing in the military.
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A review of a sample of the military grants/contracts may easily be obtained demonstrating that CPPs 
are a critical issue that have been identified by the Department of Defense of the Government of the 
United States of America(USA).  Examples of these are the DARPA PCES contract F33615-03-C-4110 
of [2], the Army Research Office, Grant Number DAAD 19-02-1-0389, “Perpetually Available and 
Secure  Information  Systems”,  to  the  Center  for  Computer  and  Communications  Security  at  the 
Carnegie Mellon University of [9] and the United States Army, Contract No. MDA 903-91-C-0006 of 
[7].   A more detailed search of various  digital  libraries  is  likely to  come up with similar  funding 
towards the same class of problems.
[9] had some interesting insights but was highly dependent on the concept of fault injection.  For the 
United States Army to have given a grant for a mission critical solution, then to almost immediately 
avail the research on the Internet, may be an indication that they did not at the time see immediate 
applicability of the research findings and were putting out feelers to the research community. 
[2] also had the benefit of military funding and so did [7] before it, clearly demonstrating the felt need 
for solutions of various kinds within military circles in the USA as the problem became more evident. 
[9] describes the concept of white box techniques that are specific to obtaining performance data from 
applications  where  the  source  code  is  known,  while  black  box  techniques  deal  with  gleaning 
information from hardware and operating system level where the specifics are shielded/proprietary.
Another class of techniques described as gray box that share characteristics of black box and white box 
techniques.   To this  researcher the problems encountered in [2] and [9] that necessitate black box 
techniques can easily be overcome by a system user that has got large purchasing and specification 
power such as the Department of Defense of the USA, that spends funds to the amount that it can 
demand for complete details, design and specification of each and every component it buys.  In such a 
scenario, a researcher into the realm of CPPs may be in a position to know of the precise make up of a  
processor even if he or she is not in a position to interact with those functions directly – an additional  
scenario that we may classify in this paper as glass box techniques.  
Converting the extensive amount of research in the domain of CPPs  in computing systems/devices into 
usable  knowledge must  be a  major  preoccupation  of  the  USA Military,  its  objectives  may not  be 
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immediately met by academia due to sublime pursuits by the same or lack of exposure to some types of 
classified  military  system  problems.   Perpetually  Available  and  Securely  Functioning  Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons, must be within this category of problems that may only be disclosed to limited 
circles in academia, despite the fact that they are a matter of great interest to a global audience.
The “Autonomous Hot Swap Healing Protocol for Chronic Performance Problem Aversion in On-
board Mission Critical Systems on Lethal Autonomous  Weapons” attempts to address these issues 
to a global audience, since weapon systems deployed must be understood by international war crimes 
tribunals,  manufacturers,  humanitarian organizations,  warfighters,  legislative bodies,  etc.   Issues  of 
applicability in the military domain may not be addressed adequately in [2] and [9] probably due to 
lack of exposure to military technology and problems, though it is not stated as such in those papers.
3 The Protocol
Autonomous Hot  Swap Healing Protocol  for Chronic  Performance Problem Aversion in On-
board Mission Critical Systems on Lethal Autonomous  Weapons, advocates for a virtual machine 
implementation of computing systems that are the mission critical components of lethal autonomous 
weapons.  A virtual machine is isolated from the hardware platform and can be specially written and 
tested to some level of specificity that eliminates the potential for easily avoidable CPPs.  The virtual 
machine would be hosted on a virtual machine platform, which in turn  interacts with the hardware 
platform directly.  
The virtual machine platform would black list and avoid interacting with faulty hardware components, 
further reducing the likelihood of avoidable CPPs.  There is anecdotal evidence that this is possible.   [2 
: page 111, Incident 4] states that the Hadoop has a mechanism for transfer of tasks from nodes that are 
affected  by CPPs or  other  problems and it  in  turn black  lists  those faulty  nodes.   Someone with 
experience  of  coding such a  function within the Hadoop,  could  be  of  use when extrapolating the 
concept to other platforms such as the proposed class of virtual machine platforms for various lethal 
autonomous weapons.
These novel virtual machines could be hot-swapped, i.e. moved from one virtual machine platform to 
another or their functions switched from one virtual machine platform to another, in order to avert a 
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disruption  when  CPPs  emerge  within  virtual  machines,  virtual  machine  platforms  or  hardware 
platforms.  A virtual machine could easily be diagnosed for CPPs because it would have no proprietary 
components  and would  be  completely transparent  to  the  owners/users.   Its  source  code  would  be 
completely available to a weapon systems engineer.
Within the same set-up of hardware platforms, virtual machine platforms and virtual machines,  there 
would  be  peer  hardware  platforms,  peer  virtual  machine  platforms  and peer  virtual  machines  and 
systems for determining the level of efficiency of the same.  When chronics of interest are detected on 
board a mission critical weapon system peer, there would be a seamless hot-swap of functionality to 
more efficient components, to ensure that mission critical operations are least affected by chronics. 
The  switching  mechanisms  would  be  known  as  swap  stations/systems  controlled  by  confidence 
modules described in [1].
The virtual machines/components could run on virtual machine platforms but not necessarily the ones 
currently in the market, as they are likely to be generic and not sufficiently specific to eliminate a wide 
range of easily avoidable CPPs.  
Once  the  issue  of  relationships  between  the  hardware  platform  and  virtual  machine  platform  is 
subcontracted  out,  the  relationships  between  the  same  shall  be  a  non-issue  to  weapons  systems 
engineers and their focus shall be the relationships between the virtual machine platform that is clearly 
known to them and the mission critical virtual machine systems that reside on them as the control base 
for  lethal  autonomous  weapons.   These  lethal  autonomous  weapon virtual  systems shall  be 100% 
mapped out and analyzed by monitoring systems in the integrity modules that pass on data to the 
confidence module.
The integrity and confidence modules must be complex software systems but they could be several also 
hosted as virtual machines to allow for their hot-swapping should the need arise.  This brings into focus 
the “Gremlins Paradox” miniaturization to actualize such a kind of system shall occur but ultimately 
new problems shall arise and compromises shall be necessary.  Techniques e.g. rule-based, machine 
learning,  statistical  or visualization methods of identification of  CPPs described in  [2] and related 
publications shall convey their data streams to the integrity module which shall make the determination 
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if or when hot-swapping between components should be commanded by the confidence modules that 
receive their output.   A schematic of such a set-up is rendered in this paper [page 11] but the source 
code and/or pseudo-code are not revealed due to the fact that they shall be of a complex and context  
specific nature.
While a hot-swap occurs a black listed mission critical system could be healed by way of rebooting and 
reconfiguration, after which it shall be autonomously tested, before it is re-certified and brought back 
online into the mission critical realm as an available component [2: pages 48, 49], [9: page 7], and as a 
marked improvement on the concept of [1: page 20].  
An interesting observation is that [9] embraces the concept of experimentation on a virtual machine 
environment, but since it utilizes fault injection techniques, the virtual machine concept in the that 
researcher's perspective, may have been a matter of convenience rather than long term practicality. 
With the confidence module, hot-swapping concept the lethal autonomous weapon shall only be run as 
a virtual machine on a platform/environment that is functioning within known parameters.
In simple terms CPPs data is generated by the specific instrumentation and forwarded to the integrity 
module, the integrity module makes a determination as to the validity of using the data from a system 
that has faulty operations or is functioning well.  This information is then forwarded to a confidence 
module that selects which specific Mission Critical System to bring online via Hot Swapping.
Given that all the techniques and technologies describe exist, but not in immediate implementation, it 
shall take a short time to actualize the extensive research and solutions/tools that deal with CPPs in the  
realm of lethal autonomy.  For purposes of clarity it should be noted that the confidence modules shall  
mediate  overall  supply  and  demand  issues  between  mission  critical  systems  on-board  a  lethal 
autonomous weapon depending upon data-streams received or not received from integrity modules.
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Schematics of the Protocol
Figure Y : Schematics of the Protocol
Layered Schematic of a Mission Critical System for a Lethal Autonomous Weapon System 
Figure K : Layered Schematic of a Mission Critical System of the type in Figure Y
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Upon review, it should be clear that Figure Y above is a converged variant of Figure A in [1 : page 43] 
and Figure 3 in [1: page 21], an effort can be made at deducing a more converged version of the two,  
but that is not an issue scoped for this paper.  The arrows are indicative of the data-streams/flows 
within the system. The letters G stands for the Gray Box Diagnostic Systems, the letters W stands for 
the White Box Diagnostic Systems while the letters B stand for Black Box Diagnostic Systems.  These 
are the systems for CPPs discovery.  
There could be a partial substitution of Gs and a complete substitution of Bs in the system with the 
Glass Box Diagnostic System, should a procuring entity have sufficient financial leverage to demand 
for and obtain all  relevant black box parameters, in addition to knowing how to exploit the same. 
Though the Gs, Ws, Bs cover a wide range of systems for diagnostics of CPPs no effort has been made 
to select or to promote any specific mode of the same at this level of architecture.
4 Conclusion
The Department of Defense of the USA and its allies are usually interested in almost “magic” type 
technologies,  that  cause  technological  surprise  against  adversarial  military forces.   If  there  was  a 
military commander who could throw a wooden staff on to the battle-space and it turns into a viper that 
devours adversarial vipers the better.  [2] and [9] do not meet this maxim of causing technological 
surprise, to the extent that the solutions described therein  cannot be deployed on-board unmanned 
lethal autonomous weapon systems without human intervention.  This paper offers some vivid insights 
into how such a feat should be achieved using current off-the-shelf technologies.
Though several references are made to [1] the assumption is that the hot-swap protocol proposed via 
this paper can be implemented in other similar contexts that are not yet publicly revealed.  Hopefully 
lethal autonomous weapons that a fielded shall be error free or error minimal, and the CPPs shall not 
become a prevalent justification for collateral damage.
In order to effect the concepts in this paper, it is foreseeable that an effort has to be made towards 
coding already existing CPPs diagnostic systems into compliance.   By use of the schematic of the 
protocol it  is possible to quantify the effort and to deliver a solution within a sensible and clearly 
illustrated framework.
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